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Great power responsibility, side-effect harms and American drone strikes in Pakistan1 
Abstract 
In International Relations, the actions of great-powers are usually assessed through their direct 
effects. Great powers are generally considered to be responsible for the consequences of their 
actions if they intentionally caused them. Though there is discussion on ‘double effects’ and 
‘side-effect harms’ in the realms of philosophy and political sociology, these largely remain 
absent from the field of International Relations. This article bridges that gap by clarifying a 
set of yardsticks through which side-effect harms of great powers’ actions can be evaluated, 
including ‘capacity’, ‘historical precedent,’ ‘voluntarism’ and ‘unintentional causality.’ These 
yardsticks are deduced through the Theory of Special Responsibilities, which combines 
elements of Constructivism and the English School. The theoretical framework presented is 
then applied to the case of American drone strikes in FATA. A number of terrorists in FATA 
have relocated elsewhere within Pakistan to escape these strikes, subsequently harming 
individuals in new locations. The contribution asks who bears responsibility for the harm 
brought to civilians by these dislocated terrorists. Analysis from the perspective of the 
theoretical framework, constructed and applied here, suggests that even if the US may claim 
not to have directly intended such an outcome, it still shares some responsibility for the harm 
to innocent civilians. 
Keywords: Great power responsibility, direct effects, side-effect harms, 
Pakistan, drones, terrorist relocation,  
 
 
1. Introduction 
International Relations academics have shown enormous interest in studying the institution of 
‘great powerhood’ in the last three decades by asking whether great responsibilities come 
with great power.2 Originating in the late 1970s, this trend is rooted in the thought that great 
powers are supposed to promote not only their national interest, but also the interest of wider 
international society.3 However, most of the research on great-power responsibility concerns 
either assessing the direct effects of the actions of the existing great powers4 or how those 
                                                          
1 The author is grateful to Professor Mlada  Bukovansky, Dr Scott Thomas and two anonymous 
reviewers for their valuable feedback on the article’s earlier drafts.  
2 Chris Brown, ‘Do great powers have great responsibilities? Great powers and moral agency,’ Global 
Society, 18 (1), pp. 5–19. 
3 The writings of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull are at the forefront in that first wave. For details, see 
Martin Wight, System of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 42; Hedley Bull, 
Anarchical Society: The Study of Order in International Politics (London: Palgrave, 1977), pp. 194-
222. Hedley Bull, ‘The great irresponsible? The United States, the Soviet Union and world order,’ 
International Journal, 35(3), 1980, pp. 437-447. It might be worth noting that Wight was building on 
Alfred Zimmern’s views put forth in the 1940s. For details, see Mlada Bukovansky, Ian Clark, Robyn 
Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, Nicholas Wheeler, Special Responsibilities: Global 
Problems and American Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 36. 
4 Bull, ‘The great irresponsibles.’ Wali Aslam, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: A prudent action by a 
responsible great power?’ Journal of Global Ethics, 6(3), pp. 305-21. 
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who are not considered great powers could assume that status by engaging in practices in 
which great powers ought to engage.5 There has been limited focus in the field of 
International Relations on highlighting yardsticks that may assist with determining how great 
powers can be held accountable for the side-effect harms of their actions, and in particular for 
the side-effects that were not directly intended. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) 6 and 
Consequentialism7 are approaches that are often employed in connection with the issues of 
intentions, actions and consequences in the fields of philosophy and political sociology, but 
such a discussion is largely absent from the realm of International Relations theories. This 
lack of IR theoretical tools available to help assess side-effect harms of the great powers’ 
actions does not help with apportioning responsibility for these actions. One such case is the 
side-effect harm caused by American drone strikes in FATA. These strikes have been the 
focus of much critical assessment from various perspectives, such as ethical8 and legal.9 
However, there has been limited examination of how these strikes affect the society of the 
targeted state. For example, limited academic examinations exist covering the side-effect 
harms of these strikes borne by Pakistani society due to terrorist relocation. Evidence suggests 
that American strikes have played a role in dislocating a number of terrorists from FATA who 
move to new locations and continue their lethal activities there.10 Here a pertinent question 
arises: who bears responsibility for the harmful consequences of terrorists’ relocation when 
they continue to harm civilians and break the law elsewhere? This question sheds light on a 
                                                          
5 Linda Quayle, ‘Power and paradox: Indonesia and the “English School” concept of Great Powers,’ 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13(2), 2013, pp. 301-330. 
6 For a useful overview see P. A. Woodward (Ed.), The Doctrine of Double Effect; Philosophers 
Debate a Controversial Moral Principle (Notre Dame: Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 
2001); Danny Marrero, ‘Is the appeal of the doctrine of double effects illusory,’ Philosophia,  Vol. 41, 
pp. 349-359 
7 For a brief but useful overview see ‘Consequentialism’ in the Standford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
27 September 2011; available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/; accessed on 26 
February 2015. 
8 Christian Enemark, ‘Drones over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics and Counterinsurgency,’ Asian Security, 
7(3), 2011, pp. 218-237. 
9 For example, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Unlawful killing with combat drones,’ A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004-2009, Notre Dame Legal Studies Article number 09-43, Notre Dame Legal Studies 
Article No. 09-43. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 
10 See for example Imtiaz Ali, ‘Karachi becoming a Taliban safe haven?’ Combating Terrorism Centre, 
13 January 2010; available from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/karachi-becoming-a-taliban-safe-
haven; last accessed on 6 June 2014. 
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gap in the IR theoretical literature concerning the side-effect harms of the actions of great 
powers; IR theory has lacked the necessary tools that may help with answering this question. 
This article bridges that gap by developing a framework consisting of yardsticks through 
which responsibility in such situations can be ascertained. The argument suggests that 
studying responsibility through intentional causality and direct effect will provide only 
limited answers to a number of questions concerning great powers’ policies. There is a need 
to consider other yardsticks when apportioning responsibility for their actions; these include 
‘capacity,’ ‘historical precedent,’ ‘voluntarism’ and ‘unintentional causality.’ The framework 
is deduced from the Theory of Special Responsibilities11 of great powers, established on a 
combination of English School and Constructivist ideas. 
This contribution applies that framework to the case of terrorist relocation due to American 
drone strikes in FATA to demonstrate its suitability and applicability for such assessments. 
Using these yardsticks, the article argues that the targeting state (in this case the United 
States) bears responsibility for the indirect-but-harmful consequences of terrorist relocation to 
the rest of Pakistan. The norms of great powers’ special responsibilities hold that the United 
States has an obligation to ensure that it does its best to protect the vulnerable from harm 
stemming from its actions, especially those who may not otherwise be protected.  
The article’s main contribution is in the field of International Relations theory, as it highlights 
the multiple ways, other than by direct effect, through which responsibility for one’s actions 
can be attributed and ascertained. To be more specific, this article contributes to the debates 
on great power responsibility by bringing the discussion of side-effect harms closer to IR 
theoretical discussions on the responsibilities of great power. It performs that task by building 
on the ideas of the English School and Constructivism through the Theory of Special 
                                                          
11 The theory of special responsibilities has been put forward by five renowned academics from United 
Kingdom, United States and Australia. For details, see Bukovansky et al., Special Responsibilities, p. 
25. 
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Responsibilities. Though these International Relations theories were not designed to perform 
that task, the contribution of this paper lies in using them to construct a normative argument. 
That may not be what the scholars from those traditions primarily intended. However, it is 
useful to employ them for such a task in order to create the tools required to perform the 
analysis of the article.12 
The discussion below will demonstrate that although there has been much focus on examining 
the empirical dimension of the subject of great-power responsibility, there remains limited 
attention paid to the theoretical dimension of this topic. That is also linked to a lack of clear 
criteria through which responsibilities of great powers vis-à-vis side-effect harms can be 
tangibly assessed, both ad bellum and in bello. The framework highlighted in this contribution 
provides guidelines for further normative and theoretical assessments of the side-effect harms 
caused by the policies of other great powers of international society.  
The drone strikes in FATA comprise a case highlighting a gap in IR theoretical literature that 
needs to be bridged. However, this contribution is not about the drones-related debate per se. 
As highlighted above, the primary contribution of the paper is in the realm of the academic 
discussion on great-power responsibility and that contribution is made by building on the 
ideas of the English School and Constructivism. That will involve highlighting how the 
‘interpretative’ dimension of these theories (‘what is?’) can be taken to build a framework 
that helps one understand how a great power should act (‘what should be?').13 This 
contribution will establish that framework independently of the drone debate. The drones-
related discussion is included to highlight the need of seeing responsibilities in multiple ways 
and that is where the paper will make its contribution.  
The next section briefly surveys the dispersal of suspected terrorists from the highly targeted 
parts of FATA to other locations within Pakistan along with its impact on the civilians in 
                                                          
12 The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this article for this point. 
13 The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this article for this point. 
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these new locations. The third section of the article examines the literature on great power 
responsibility, highlighting how that literature concerns itself with either assessing the direct 
effects of great powers’ actions (and issues of intentional causality) or with the questions of 
how emerging powers can enter the club of great powers. That section also shows that little 
work has been conducted on clarifying yardsticks through which side-effect harms of great 
powers’ actions can be examined. The fourth section specifically looks at the DDE and 
Consequentialism, highlighting their weaknesses in serving as useful analytical tools with 
respect to the current case study in particular. That section also shows that, although these are 
relevant approaches in other disciplines, these theories are of limited utility with regard to 
debates on great-power responsibility in International Relations theories. The fifth section 
consults the Theory of Special Responsibility to outline a set of yardsticks, mentioned earlier. 
The framework consisting of these yardsticks is then employed in the sixth section to argue 
that the targeting state (the US) can be held responsible for harm caused to the vulnerable in 
the targeted state (Pakistan) due to terrorist relocation. That section also studies how issues of 
responsibility are linked to legitimacy and how a great power risks losing its standing as a 
responsible great power if it does not pay attention to the full range of responsibilities 
highlighted in this article. The conclusion summarises the findings of the study highlighting 
unique insights gleaned through the application of the framework examined here. 
2. Drones and terrorist relocation from FATA  
The relocation of terrorists, militants and insurgents from their ‘original’ theatre generally 
remains an understudied phenomenon.14 There have been some relevant studies on how 
Mujahedeen dispersed from Afghanistan after the anti-Soviet jihad, with some returning to 
join al-Qaeda in the 1990s.15 Owen Bennett Jones has further outlined how al-Qaeda fighters 
                                                          
14 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  
15 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden (London: 
Penguin). See for example, see p. 475.  
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moved across the border to Pakistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.16 However, 
these studies do not examine the impact of relocation on the new host communities. 
The American drone campaign in FATA started in 2004 and since then most of the strikes 
have centred on the tribal areas. Out of 396 total strikes, 390 have targeted locations in FATA 
with only six hitting the targets in the adjacent Khaibar Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.17 
Unsurprisingly, a number of militants sought by drones left FATA altogether to avoid them.18 
A major report jointly published by New York University and Stanford University in 
September 2012 also highlighted how groups such as al Qaeda learnt quite quickly to avoid 
the tribal areas of Pakistan not long after the US started to use the drones there in 2004.19 It is 
no surprise that Osama bin Laden was found to be residing in Abbottabad, a Pakistani city 
quite a distance away from FATA.  
This relocation to other destinations in Pakistan has come with serious, and quite often lethal, 
consequences for their new locales, which include the southern mega-city of Karachi and the 
relatively safer tribal area of Kurram. The activities of these individuals in their new refuges 
vary from location to location. They include involvement in organised crime, sectarian and 
jihadi violence and the perpetrating of other petty crimes.  
The Associated Press, among other sources, has noted that a number of militants fled the 
tribal area of Pakistan to take refuge in the southern port city of Karachi precisely because 
drones cannot and will not target the city.20 The US-based Combating Terrorism Centre 
pointed out in 2010 that ‘fighters from multiple Taliban factions are increasingly moving to’ 
                                                          
16 Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (London: Yale, 2009), pp. 27-30.  
17 The data is correct as of 25 February 2015. It has been accessed from the website of New America 
Foundation. For details see http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis; last accessed 25 
February 2015. 
18 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ‘Washington’s phantom war,’ Foreign Affairs, July/August 
2011. 
19 See ‘Living under drones: Death, injury and trauma to civilians from US drone practices in Pakistan,’ 
A report compiled by Stanford International Human Rights & Conflict Resolution Clinic, 24 
September 2012, available at http://www.livingunderdrones.org/living-under-drones/ 
20 Ashraf Khan and Nahal Toosi, ‘Taliban Finding safety in Karachi,’ Associated Press, 17 May 2009. 
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Karachi as they ‘continue to flee U.S. drone strikes and Pakistani military operations in the 
country’s northwest tribal regions.’21 Pakistani police and intelligence officials have also 
confirmed that the Taliban and other militants have fled Pakistan’s tribal areas due to the US 
drone strikes but continue their brutal activities in Karachi where drones cannot reach them.22 
According to these officials, they have been involved in ‘kidnapping for ransom, bank 
robbery, street robbery and other heinous crimes.’23 Other destinations where these 
individuals have moved include the Punjab province of Pakistan24 as well as relatively safer 
agencies within FATA, one of which is Kurram agency. This particular agency is surrounded 
by Afghan territory to the north and the west, and borders North Waziristan agency to the 
south. The tribal agency of North Waziristan has been the prime target of drones: according to 
the most recent count, it alone has attracted approximately 72 per cent of the total strikes 
conducted by the United States in the tribal areas of Pakistan.25 Kurram is the only agency in 
FATA with a significant Shia population: around 40 per cent of the population belongs to the 
sect.26 The agency is also one of the preferred destinations of the militants fleeing North 
Waziristan.27 The militants take refuge there as, like Karachi, US drones do not usually target 
this agency – although in this case due to its significant Shia population.28 
The militants’ attempts to find a new home in Kurram are resisted by locals who, for obvious 
reasons, do not want the American drones to start striking there.29 As a result, inhabitants of 
Kurram have been increasingly targeted by these new arrivals due to their refusal to provide 
them a safe haven in the area. Kurram’s stability has subsequently been marred by huge 
                                                          
21 Imtiaz Ali, ‘Karachi becoming a Taliban safe haven?’ Combating Terrorism Centre, 13 January 
2010; available from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/karachi-becoming-a-taliban-safe-haven; last 
accessed on 6 June 2014. 
22 see ‘Fear of Taliban influx looms in Karachi,’ Dawn, 17 May 2009. 
23 ibid. 
24 Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Opel and Eric Schmitt, ‘United militants threaten Pakistan’s populous 
heart,’ The New York Times, 13 April 2009. 
25 See the database compiled by the Long War Journal at http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-
strikes.php; last accessed on 25 February 2015.  
26 Zia Ur Rehman, ‘The Battle for Kurram,’ The Friday Times, 8 March 2012.  
27 Tom Wright and Owais Tohid, ‘Drones push Taliban from a Pakistani haven,’ The Wall Street 
Journal, 5 November 2010.  
28 ibid. 
29 see ’95 die as Kurram reels under fresh violence,’ The Nation, 1 September 2008. 
 8 
sectarian strife over the past six years.30 The Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban has been 
busily negotiating with the Shia tribal elders in Kurram to let its fleeing comrades remain, but 
the issue remains unresolved.31  
The negative consequences of the dispersal of militants from FATA beg an obvious question: 
who can be held responsible for these side-effect harms of the use of drones? The policy 
makers in the US can easily state that they did not intend to create that eventuality, even if it 
could be foreseen, and hence they cannot be held accountable for it. This scenario points to a 
gap in IR theoretical literature on great power responsibility as there do not exist many 
yardsticks that could be used to assess ‘the side-effect harms’ or ‘double-effects’ of a great 
power’s actions that were not part of that state’s direct plan. Though there has been much 
discussion in the field of ethics and philosophy on ‘double-effects,’ such discussion is almost 
completely absent from the realm of International Relations theories.  The next section will 
briefly survey that literature on great-power responsibility highlighting the recent interest in 
evaluating great-power practices. The section will also show how that interest has not led to 
the development of certain yardsticks that could be employed to study the side-effect harms 
of great powers’ actions. 
3. Great powers and great responsibilities 
There has been much interest over the last three decades in studying the responsibilities of the 
great powers in international society. Authors such as Hedley Bull discussed the protection of 
international order as an example of the international interest that great powers should 
promote.32 That international order would guarantee the protection and continuation of a 
pluralist international society that ‘accepted differences in values.’33 However, recently, the 
                                                          
30 ibid. 
31 Wright and Tohid, ‘Drones push Taliban from a Pakistani haven.’ 
32 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. 
33 Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese power and the idea of a responsible state,’ The China Journal, 45, 2001, p. 
9. 
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focus of such assessments has shifted from protecting international order towards ‘a focus on 
the sovereignty of individuals rather than states.’34 
The primary concern of recent studies of great powers’ responsibilities has been the 
assessment of US foreign-policy practices. Some of them include the examination of the 
recent invasion of Iraq and the practice of extraordinary rendition.35 The idea of American 
responsibilities has also been coupled with American leadership, with some scholars 
examining the case for American leadership in dealing with problems in the Asia-Pacific 
region.36 
The assessments concerning great-power responsibility have also focused on other global and 
regional great powers and their roles in international society. For example, Rosemary Foot 
has discussed how China increasingly sought to acquire acknowledgement from others of its 
great-power status, along with its status as a radical socialist revolutionary state.37 According 
to Foot, China started a journey in the 1980s towards portraying itself as a cooperative and 
responsible great power whose policies contrast with those of a unilateralist United States.38 
Justin Morris also examined the case of Great Britain asking ‘how great is Britain’?39 Morris 
contended that Britain could be described as a great power given its ideational capabilities40 
that allow the country’s leadership to pursue foreign policies that would be ‘wholly untenable 
for other, far less powerful, states.’41 
                                                          
34 Ibid, p. 9; The two viewpoints have been captured through the English School concepts of pluralism 
and solidarism. For details, see Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘Hedley Bull’s pluralism of the 
intellect and solidarism of the will,’ International Affairs, 72(1), 1996, pp. 91-107. 
35 Wali Aslam, The United States and the idea of Great Power Responsibility in International society: 
Invasion, Drones and Renditin, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).  
36 Douglas Stuart, ‘Leading from behind: Toward a new US strategy for the Asia Pacific,’ Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, 24(2), 2012, pp. 141-155. 
37 Ibid, p. 7. 
38 Ibid, p. 15. 
39 Justin Morris, ‘How Great is Britain? Power, responsibility and Britain’s future role,’ The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13(3), 2011, pp. 326-327.   
40 Ibid, p. 333. 
41 Ibid, p. 335. 
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This interest in studying the institution of great powers has also considered regional powers. 
For example, Linda Quayle examines the case of Indonesia, enquiring whether it could be 
described as a great power.42 While studying Indonesia’s status, Quayle points towards an 
important gap in the literature on the subject. She asserts that most of the literature on great 
powers usually focuses on external recognition of states as such.43 However, there has not 
been much discussion on internal recognition: the role played by a state’s citizens in 
determining their own country’s status as a great power with special rights and duties.’44 She 
argues that in order to achieve the status of great power, external recognition has to be 
complemented by an internal recognition in a way that a state’s leaders think of themselves as 
leaders of a great power and act accordingly.  
Amrita Narlikar studies India’s status as a great power, suggesting that due to its desire to 
enjoy a ‘free-ride,’ instead of providing leadership, India cannot be described as a responsible 
great power.45 Examining the case of Japan, Shogo Suzuki has stated that Japan aspires to be 
recognised as a great power, which is why it participates in activities such as the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).46 Taking part in such activities is an attempt to 
show to the rest of the international community on the part of the country that it does not 
desire to upset the status quo.47 That also serves as a ‘strategy for tackling and negating the 
criticisms of their neighbours,’ the criticisms that are detrimental in their quest to gain 
legitimacy from the international society of its status as a great power.48  
                                                          
42 Linda Quayle, ‘Power and paradox: Indonesia and the “English School” concept of Great Powers,’ 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13(2), 2013, pp. 301-330. 
43 Ibid, p. 305. 
44 Ibid, p. 305. 
45 Amrita Narlikar, ‘Is India a responsible great power,’ Third World Quarterly, 32(9), 2011, pp. 1607-
1621. 
46 Shogo Suzuki, ‘Seeking “legitimate” great power status in post-Cold War international society: 
China’s and Japan’s participation in UNPKO,’ International Relations, 22(1), 2008, pp. 45-63; see also 
Andrew Oros, ‘Japan’s security future’ in Samit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Liow, The 
Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 23-34.  
47 Ibid, p. 54. 
48 Ibid, pp. 54-55. 
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This brief overview of the literature on the subject of great power responsibility shows that 
the interest in studying the institutions of great powers in international society can be divided 
in two camps largely. It is either focused on assessing the direct effects of great powers’ 
responsibilities or it examines how other states try to be recognised as great powers. There is 
a lack of conceptual literature to help deal with the side-effects of great powers’ actions. The 
DDE and Consequentialism deals with the issues of double-effects and side-effect harms but 
they are not useful approaches in the realm of International Relations theory. The next section 
will look at both of those approaches highlighting their deficiencies. The discussion will then 
proceed to clarifying a novel theoretical framework based on the Theory of Special 
Responsibilities of great powers; it is this framework which will bridge the exsiting gap in the 
literature. 
4. The Doctrine of Double Effect and Consequentialism 
The discussion so far has pointed towards a gap in IR theoretical literature concerning the 
absence of a theoretical framework that may help assess side-effect harms of great powers’ 
actions. Though many scholars have employed the DDE49 and consequentialism50 to study the 
questions of actions, intentions and consequences, these approaches are of limited utility. This 
section will look at both these approaches briefly while arguing that they do not serve the 
purpose of dealing with the given case study and to conduct IR theoretical analysis of the type 
required here. Hence, there is a need to come up with a unique approach for assessments of 
the side-effect harms of the great powers’ actions. 
 
                                                          
49 see for example David Chan, ‘Intention and responsibility in double effect cases,’ Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice, 3(4), 2000, pp. 405-34 
50 C. D. Meyers, ‘Brain, trolleys and intuitions: Defining deontology from the Greene/Singer 
argument,’ Philosophical Psychology, 28 (4), 2015, pp. 466-486.  
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The DDE is often consulted to study actions that might be undertaken with good intentions 
but may have harmful side-effects that might be foreseen but unintended.51 The roots of the 
DDE go back to the writings of Thomas Aquinas who is credited for saying that ‘nothing 
hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other one is 
beside the intention… the act of self-defense may have two effects: one, the saving of one’s 
life; the other, the slaying of the aggressor.’52 Generally speaking, for a side-effect harm of an 
action to be justified under the DDE, the following four conditions have to be attached to that 
action:53 
 
a) The act is good in itself, or at least indifferent, which means, for our purposes, that is a 
legitimate act of war. 
b) The direct effect is morally acceptable – the destruction of military supplies, for example, 
or the killing of enemy soldiers. 
c) The intention of the actor is good – that is, he only aims at the acceptable effect; the evil 
effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends. 
d) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect; it must be 
justifiable under … proportionality rule.54 
 
The principle of double-effect has been usefully applied in a number of cases such as 
suicide55 and euthanasia56 and assisted suicide.57 Though successful in dealing with these 
                                                          
51 For a brief introduction of the approach, see G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Just War: the Cause of World War 
II’ in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy; An Anthology 
(Oxford: Blackwell publishing, 2006), p. 627 
52 See ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ in the Standford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 23 September 2014; 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/; accessed on 26 February 2015 
53 These points appear in Michael Walzer’s landmark work Just and Unjust Wars. For details, see 
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), p. 153  
54 Warren Quinn has phrased these conditions in simpler terms stating that ‘the intended final end must 
be good; the intended means to it must be morally acceptable; the foreseen bad upshot must not itself 
be willed (that is must not be, in some sense, intended); the good end must be proportionate to the bad 
upshot (that is, must be important enough to justify the bad upshot). Warren Quinn, ‘Actions, intentions 
and consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 18(4), 1989, p. 334n 
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cases, the principles of the DDE do not help with the case of terrorist relocation caused by 
American drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan, for several reasons. The DDE works on 
the basis of certain prerequisites for it to serve as a useful tool to study side-effect harms of an 
action. However, the side-effect harms caused by the drone strikes do not meet those 
prerequisites. This approach works on the assumption that the agent will be very scrupulous 
in his or her actions and will act with extreme caution. Some side-effects of its actions may be 
justified if the action was conducted on the basis of caution and circumspection with the 
objective of achieving a good outcome. Applied to the case study at hand, that would mean 
that the United States would be expected to be scrupulously targeting certain specified targets 
in FATA, employing precision weapons. However, that is not the case. There are doubts over 
how circumspectly these strikes have been conducted as there have been many instances 
where they have been launched without a clear idea of the target. Some of the reasons of this 
lack of circumspection are given below.   
 
First, some of the strikes are conducted as ‘signature strikes’ where certain patterns of 
behaviour are considered legitimate targets. According to the New York Times, ‘signature 
strikes are based on assessments that men carrying weapons in a militant compound are 
legitimate targets.’58 Quoting unnamed security officials, the paper asserted that many strikes 
targeted groups of suspected militants who were not on any lists.59 These signature strikes 
resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians who might conform to the pattern of behaviour 
attracting strikes.60 Such patterns may involve attending a jirga (a tribal gathering) or a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
55 Robert Martin, ‘Suicide and self-sacrifice’ in  M. Pabst Battin and David J. Mayo (Eds.), Suicide: the 
Philosophical Issues (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), pp. 48-68. 
56 Greg Beabout, ‘Morphine use for terminal cancer patients: an application of the principle of double 
effects,’ Philosophy in Context, 19, pp. 49-57. 
57 See ‘The doctrine of double effects,’ BBC Ethics Guide; available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/euthanasia/overview/doubleeffect.shtml; accessed on 26 February 2015. 
58 Scott Shane, ‘U.S. said to target rescuers at drone strike sites,’ The New York Times, 5 February 
2012. 
59 ibid. 
60 Owen Bowcott, ‘Drone attacks in Pakistan are counter productive, says report,’ The Guardian, 1 
May 2012. 
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wedding with their weapons.61 Second, in order to assert that it has minimised the loss of 
civilian lives, the Obama administration has also redefined the term ‘targets’ that America’s 
drones might be attacking. Now it considers anyone who is ‘military-age males in a strike 
zone’ to be targets.62 Third, some of these strikes are so-called ‘double-tap’ bombings, 
defined as a ‘follow-up attack aimed at those who go to the scene of the original attack to 
rescue the wounded and remove the dead.’63 These are done despite clear protections 
enshrined in the Geneva conventions to those who ‘collect and care for the wounded, whether 
friend or foe.’64 These three aspects of the American drone programme in Pakistan 
demonstrate that the side-effect harm to civilians due to drones cannot be justified according 
to the DDE, given that there are major questions concerning the action itself that produces the 
side-effect harm. The examples show how it is hard to justify that these strikes are conducted 
with caution and circumspection enshrined in the principles of the DDE, thereby showing the 
weaknesses of the approach to help assess the side-effect harms caused due to the terrorist 
relocation due to these strikes. The way they are conducted goes against the first principle of 
doing good in the DDE.  
 
Michael Walzer has also referred to a weakness of the DDE in the matters of wars where 
civilians’ lives are put in danger to achieve military objectives. He argues that it is not 
possible to expect that there will be no civilian casualties in wars and the DDE is an attempt 
at ‘reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking noncombatants with the legitimate 
conduct of military activity.’65 However, the DDE is weak when it asserts that though the loss 
of civilians’ lives in conflict may be foreseen, it was unintended. For Walzer, an attention to 
producing good (the first intention) has to be linked to an intention to minimise harm (the 
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second intention) as the outcomes are the product of a ‘double intention.’66 He refers to a dual 
responsibility: first, ‘that the “good” be achieved; second, that the foreseeable evil be reduced 
as far as possible.’67 He goes on to say  
 
Simply not to intend the death of civilians is too easy; most often, under battle conditions, the 
intentions of soldiers are focused narrowly on the enemy. What we look for in such cases is 
some sign of a positive commitment to save civilian lives … and if saving civilian lives means 
risking soldiers’ lives, the risk must be accepted… These are, after all, unintended deaths and 
legitimate military operations, and the absolute rule against attacking civilians does not apply. 
War necessarily places civilians in danger… we can only ask soldiers to minimise the dangers 
they impose.68  
 
This weakness of the DDE highlighted by Walzer makes sense: in the context of the current 
case study, the American action cannot only be assessed through its (first) intention to achieve 
a good objective. It must be asked whether the United States took due care in minimising 
harm for the civilians in the host societies at the receiving end of American drones (second 
intention). This does not seem to be the case here. President Obama’s drone policy has been 
aimed at ensuring that the tribal areas of Pakistan do not serve as safe havens to terrorists. 
Justifying his approach, President Obama stressed in 2009 that his administration would 
‘work both smartly and effectively, but with consistency in order to make sure that those safe 
havens don't exist.’69 That suggests that the US in this case was more interested in ensuring 
that the tribal areas are rid of militants (through being killed or relocating) and not with the 
side-effect harms of their relocation. The policy assertions do not discuss the harm caused by 
this relocation if these individuals moved out of the region and engage in violence elsewhere 
as that would not be America’s responsibility. Though this approach might be understandable 
under the DDE, it also reveals its weaknesses as highlighted by Walzer above.  
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One tactic employed for ensuring that the tribal areas are not used for attacks against 
international forces in Afghanistan or to hatch any plot against the West includes attempts to 
create a climate of fear. That is done by using drone strikes quite liberally and, quite often, as 
‘double-tap’ strikes. Though there were only 51 strikes during the entire duration of the Bush 
administration, President Obama escalated these strikes from 2009 onward with 52 strikes 
taking place in 2009 alone and 122 during 2010.70 A number of reputable sources have 
asserted that instead of eliminating specific threats to the United States, such strikes have 
been conducted to scare people off from rescuing those injured and to deter journalists from 
entering the area to assess the situation.71 This approach may make sense if one were to 
understand American objectives of self-defence and may be justified under the DDE. 
However, according to Walzer, for an action to be truly ethical, it must involve an obligation 
on the part of the agent of taking responsibility to minimise harm to non-combatants. Creating 
a climate of fear might be understandable according to the DDE but that does not in itself 
show any intention to minimise harm to non-combatants. Hence this approach is not an 
adequate application of the assessment of side-effect harms caused by this action. 
 
The principles of Consequentialism may also be applied to study the side-effect harms caused 
by American drone strikes in the FATA. There are many branches of this school of thought72 
and ‘Act Consequentialism’ may be the most relevant of these given the context of the current 
case. Act Consequentialism asserts that an act will be morally right ‘if that act maximizes the 
good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for 
all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that 
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occasion.’73 Though this approach might be helpful in the matters of social philosophy, it does 
not help bridge a gap concerning the lack of yardsticks in IR theoretical literature relating to 
the issue of side-effect harms. International politics cannot be understood on the basis of this 
approach as this perspective is more focused on studying different societal impacts of our 
actions. That means that there is a need of a suitable criterion that could be used in order to 
conduct the required normative assessments. The following section performs that task through 
the Theory of Special Responsibilities by building on the ideas of the English School and 
Constructivism.  This criterion will assist with the study of the side-effect harms of great 
powers’ actions more appropriately; this sort of responsibility needs to be specified more 
clearly when it comes to great powers and that is the course that the debate below will take. 
 
5. Responsibility, accountability and side-effect harms 
The burgeoning interest in the idea of great-power responsibility and the ‘recognition 
games’74 played by various great powers led five prominent academics from the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Australia to outline the case for a theory of great-power 
responsibilities in 2012. Their landmark work, entitled Special Responsibilities: Global 
Problems and American Power, asserts that there is much evidence of ‘a practice in the quest 
of a theory.’75 This work refers to the responsibilities of great powers as ‘special 
responsibilities,’ defining them as a ‘differentiated set of obligations, the allocation of which 
is collectively agreed, and they provide a principle of social differentiation for managing 
collective problems in a world characterised by both formal equality and inequality of 
material capability.’76 These responsibilities act as a ‘unique compromise’ between the 
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principles of sovereign equality on the one hand and material differentiation on the other.77 
The idea of special responsibilities comes into being when naked power fails along with the 
bargaining among equals, ‘leading instead to a search for a hierarchical but socially grounded 
politics of responsibility.’78 This work highlights the need to study special responsibilities 
within specific ‘functional and policy domains’ in order to get more out of the concept.79 A 
generalised attribution of responsibilities to certain states in international society will not 
help. 
By constituting international social roles and defining the parameters of legitimate political 
action within given social domains, special responsibilities shape the nature and distribution of 
social power. Because of this, they constitute a key site of political contestation – it matters to 
states how special responsibilities are defined and allocated, and much of contemporary world 
politics is concerned with claiming, acknowledging, allocating, shirking and contesting who 
gets to be responsible for what, when and how.80 
The Theory of Special Responsibilities has been built on the ideas of the English School and 
Constructivism. The English School concept of ‘international society’ provides the 
groundwork for the theory. Great powers consider themselves to be the legitimate leaders of 
an international society in which states have rights and responsibilities.81 On the other side, 
Constructivist ideas concerning identity play an important role in highlighting how major 
players in international society seek acknowledgement from the rest of the society concerning 
their status as major powers.82 Rights and responsibilities are social concepts and they can 
only exist in an international society. Hence, a combination of the English School and 
Constructivism provides most suitable basis to develop the theory.   
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The idea of legitimacy, a common thread within the two theoretical approaches, is at the heart 
of the theory of special responsibilities. When power is seen to be resting on a state’s 
capabilities in terms of its material resources, the only constraint on its power would be 
‘insufficient material resources or countervailing power.’83 However, in an international 
society, that is not the case. States aspire for their actions to be seen as legitimate and would 
refrain from engaging in an illegitimate activity if they had the capacity to do so. The United 
States has the power to bomb an enemy state’s major cities anytime – simply because it can. 
However, this is unlikely to happen; one of the reasons for not doing so would be because that 
will not be considered appropriate and hence also not legitimate in the eyes of other members 
of international society. In other words, material resources are only part of the power. The rest 
of the power comes from the legitimacy granted to a great power by the rest of international 
society.84 There is an implicit understanding in international society that power needs to be 
disciplined and, more importantly, ‘channelled’ in such a way that it is ‘contained within 
socially acceptable bounds and harnessed to productive social ends.’85 The norms of negative 
responsibility prohibit actors from acting in certain ways even if they have the capability to 
act in that way. On the other hand, the norms of positive responsibility also demand of actors 
that they employ their capacities in certain ways even when they may not be very interested in 
doing so.86 
Legitimacy is an under-appreciated component of a state’s power. It is important because it 
brings with it ‘voluntary compliance’87 as others regard an actor’s ends to be rightful without 
the need to coerce and bribe them. If an actor is perceived to be acting responsibly, its 
material and non-material power increases. Hence legitimacy serves as the ‘social face’ of 
power.88 A state’s allies are more likely to lend it a helping hand if its policy is generally 
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considered to be ‘appropriate’ and responsible. On the other hand, these allies are likely to 
come under pressure by their own citizens to not get involved in irresponsible ventures of a 
great power if they are seen as irresponsible by the rest of the international society.  
Where the theory of special responsibilities is groundbreaking in that it theorises a 
phenomenon that has been widely studied, it also provides scope to build yardsticks through 
which a responsible action can be assessed. The rest of this section will concern itself with 
doing just that. When studying accountability, great powers are usually held responsible and 
‘answerable’ for their historical agency and, by extension, the impact of ‘their actions in the 
preceding causal story.’89 They may have knowingly caused the problem and may be held 
accountable for the consequences. This is where most of the studies on responsibility in 
International Relations theory tend to focus. This demonstrates, however, a rather narrow 
understanding of how responsibility for one’s actions can be attributed in the field of 
International Relations.  
Responsibilities for one’s actions are usually assessed through direct effect, intentional 
causality and historical agency. Though that is undoubtedly the first step in any such 
discussion, it is clearly not the only one. As responsibilities relate to one’s past actions, they 
also concern one’s activities in the future. For example, ministers are accountable for the 
future functioning of their ministries and teachers are accountable for the prospective welfare 
of pupils when parents bring them to school.90 Hence, ‘prospective responsibility is as much 
about answerability as historical responsibility.’91 A focus only on past causality could 
distract from the future.92 The great powers in international society are endowed with special 
responsibility because (like ministers in a new government), it is expected that they will 
perform their duties in a way that will not increase others’ vulnerability. They are obliged to 
produce ‘good’ and to prevent ill happening from their actions within the wider international 
                                                          
89 Ibid, p. 38. 
90 Ibid, p. 53. 
91 Ibid, p. 56. 
92 Bukovansky et al., Special Responsibilities, p. 56. 
 21 
society. Prospective responsibility can be split in two realms, ‘productive’ and ‘preventive’ 
responsibility, with the former referring to the production of certain goods and the latter 
relating to the prevention of particular ills in the future.93 Hence, a reliance on the yardstick of 
intentional causality is not sufficient for thorough normative evaluations of states’ actions.  
At times, the great powers are asked to be answerable simply because they are powerful and 
have the capacity to protect the vulnerable.94 The idea of capacity is linked to the second 
yardstick against which responsibility can be measured. It links responsibility with 
answerability instead of restricting it to causality and direct effects. The roots of the word 
‘responsibility’ are found in the Latin word ‘respondeo,’ which means ‘to answer.’95 One can 
be answerable for the consequences of their actions that were not intended. For example, we 
do not hold an earthquake ‘responsible’ for countless deaths because in order to be truly held 
responsible, it will have to have not only ‘caused those deaths, it would have to be answerable 
and accountable for them.’96 Hence because one cannot hold an earthquake to account for 
certain deaths, it cannot be held responsible. On the other hand, in the aftermath of a major 
earthquake anywhere in the world, materially capable states are expected to partake in the 
relief operation to protect those harmed by the natural calamity. That means that an 
understanding of responsibility should not be totally unrelated to the material realm of 
capabilities and capacities. One is held responsible if they are capable of acting to prevent 
harm from happening or to alleviate the suffering of the hurt. For example, Papua New 
Guinea is unlikely to be held accountable for not acting after a major natural disaster, but the 
same might not hold for France or Great Britain.  
Third, a state can be considered to be responsible for its actions if there is a historical 
precedent of it acting as a responsible great power in the past. International society calls on 
those states to act which throughout history have expressed an interest in dealing with global 
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crises and have a reputation as reliable powers to be called on in difficult times. A country 
may have the wealth and resources to act but lack certain historical precedent to have acted in 
the way in which responsible great powers are expected to. That state will not be expected to 
perform certain functions during difficult times. Their peers, however, may be expected to act 
at that time given their historical record. Historical precedent suggests that over time, certain 
states ‘show themselves to be reliable in the performance of their responsibilities.’97  
Fourth, responsibility relates to voluntarism.98 For an agent to be held accountable, it must 
have ‘the capacity to have acted differently.’99 A great power is held responsible for an action 
when it has had the choice or discretion to act in the way it did and was not forced to do so. 
That means that choice and responsibility go hand in hand. 
Fifth, and finally, responsibilities are not always seen through intentionality. Though 
intentions are important, an agent cannot always claim that they did not intend for an action to 
have certain consequence, so they should be declared blameless. This is similar to a 
developed country today stating that it does not have much responsibility to alleviate the harm 
of global warming because it did not intend to cause it when it was industrialising hundreds of 
years ago.100 This example indicates that one could be held accountable for putting someone 
in a vulnerable position even if they did not intend to do so while causing the problem.  
There may be situations where a capable agent did not intend and could not have foreseen that 
their actions would make others vulnerable, but they nonetheless derive benefits from the 
activity that created the relevant vulnerability. If A accepts a free meal, not knowing that it 
was intended for B who was impoverished and malnourished, then A would be expected to 
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purchase B a replacement meal or provide compensation because the benefits derived by A 
may be directly linked to the unmet needs of B.101 
In brief, apportioning responsibility for certain harms is not a straightforward matter and if 
responsibility were limited only to direct effects and intentional causality, then harm suffered 
by certain innocent victims may never be addressed.102 It can often be the case that ‘the agent 
who caused harm may not have intended or foreseen harm; the agent who is clearly at fault 
may not have the capacity to redress the harm; and the agent with the capacity to prevent or 
remedy the harm may be entirely free of blame.’103 
6. Assessing responsibility for side-effect harms of terrorist relocation in Pakistan 
The article so far has engaged with the Theory on Special Responsibilities to outline a 
framework consisting of four yardsticks (in addition to that pertaining to intentional causality 
and direct effect). This framework will now be used to examine the current case study and 
answer the question: who bears responsibility for the harmful consequences of terrorists’ 
relocation from FATA when they continue their lethal activities elsewhere? Policymakers in 
the United States have tried to justify their attacks in FATA using the language of America’s 
rights and responsibilities.104 This is not uncommon. Powerful states have often asserted a 
privileged right to be recognised as guardians of international order and their position has 
usually been recognised by the rest of the international society.105    
The first yardstick of this article’s framework refers to causality and historical agency: one 
could be held accountable for a problem if they intentionally caused the problem through their 
past actions. Here, the key question would ask: did the US intentionally ‘cause’ suspected 
terrorists to relocate from FATA to other parts of Pakistan? Washington could argue that it 
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has not intentionally caused the negative consequences of these individuals’ relocation from 
FATA. They could have chosen to stay put and continue waging jihad against American 
interests. Alternatively they could renounce violence and live peacefully with the rest of the 
population in FATA. This is a legitimate claim and employment of the first yardstick that 
focuses on the direct, intended effect of one’s actions may only provide a narrow criterion to 
assess the actions of the US in this case. Hence there is a need for further yardsticks with 
which to assess American responsibility.  
The second yardstick in the previous section relates to capacity and whether an agent will be 
expected to perform certain functions, and refrain from certain acts, given its enormous 
capacities. That yardstick will help assess an action when an agent did not intentionally cause 
the problem. The policy elites in the US could argue that terrorists are able to perpetrate harm 
on the civilians in Pakistan because their own state is inept and cannot perform the duty of 
protecting them. According to this view, if the Pakistani state is unable to provide security to 
its citizens, doing so should not be an American responsibility. However, the Theory of 
Special Responsibilities consulted here will argue that, specifically because their own state 
cannot be of much value in protecting them, the policymakers in Washington cannot be let off 
the hook. They still have an obligation to be mindful of that eventuality while deciding to 
employ drones in FATA. The Pakistani state has limited resources and suffers from the 
problems of endemic corruption and poor governance. If one were to say that in this case 
responsibility will only be attributed ‘to those who are directly causally responsible and/or 
culpable, then some harm suffered by innocent victims may never be addressed at all.’106 This 
understanding of responsibility will oblige American policymakers to use their country’s 
immense capacity to employ alternative ways to tackle the problems the UAV strikes are 
meant to solve. A liberal use of these strikes has been rightly criticised by Plaw and 
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Fricker.107 Such weapons cannot be the answer to every ill emanating from FATA. Employing 
alternative means to tackle the issue of terrorism in FATA is possible as in the past, the US 
has curtailed drone strikes to achieve certain ends.108  
A great power stands to lose legitimacy if it does not fulfil the expectations others hold of it, 
as the notions of responsibility and legitimacy are closely connected. A state will not be 
considered a responsible great power unless it is recognised in that way by the majority of the 
members of international society, thereby granting it legitimacy.109 One may amass great 
material power with a desire to be considered as such but the pedestal of a responsible great 
power is granted to a state through recognition by others. It cannot be obtained through the 
attainment or employment of military might alone. The examples of Napoleonic France and 
Nazi Germany are two cases in point. Legitimacy depends on others’ voluntary recognition 
and none can be coerced into granting such a status through force. Furthermore, as such a 
status can be granted, it can also be withdrawn. The way a state is perceived matters greatly 
and its reputation as a responsible great power is subject to change when its behaviour is seen 
to not be conforming to that expected of a responsible great power. International society holds 
certain expectations from a great power that relate to acknowledging the extent of its stake in 
the system110 and refraining from acts that might be construed as not contributing to the goals 
of the wider international community. If a great power engages in a unilateralist and norm-
violating behaviour, it can lose its ‘special’ status as a responsible great power, as was the 
case with the US losing its legitimacy in the early 2000s due to perceived lack of respect for 
international law and international institutions.111  
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The norms of legitimacy are held dear because they construct a ‘legitimacy snare’ to stop the 
dominant power from acting irresponsibly. The threat of a withdrawal of recognition of great 
power’s ‘responsible’ status serves that purpose.112 Once that recognition is withdrawn, 
actions undertaken to protect international order lose their legitimacy. Instead of being 
justified under the garb of a great power’s international responsibilities, they are seen as 
naked manifestation of power that lacks social roots – the use of force without any social 
legitimacy behind it. Alexander Wendt argues that although role-identities are subjective, the 
roles themselves are ‘objective, collectively constituted positions that give meaning to those 
understandings.’113 Without the recognition being granted, a mere role-identity is meaningless 
as that role is not recognised by international society in the first place.  
The third yardstick relates to a great power’s historical record in dealing with global 
problems. The US has traditionally portrayed itself as the guardian of international society, 
leading major scholars to assess American policies from the perspective of great-power 
responsibility.114 A glance at history reveals that Washington clearly wishes to be seen as a 
responsible great power and its official rhetoric of rights and responsibilities is not a mere 
ploy for hiding its self-interest. The US also has a historical precedent of acting as a great 
power. Hence, it will be expected to take responsibility for not doing something to alleviate 
the side-effect harms to Pakistani civilians indirectly caused by its own actions even if it 
could argue that it did not intentionally cause the problem. American policy makers will be 
expected to intentionally try to minimise civilian harm as discussed by Walzer earlier. The US 
has a long history of involvement in the AfPak region and its managerial activities in that part 
of the world link it to the vulnerable civilians in the area in a unique manner, regardless of the 
prevalence of drone strikes. This relationship was discussed by John Kerry in 2008 when he 
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said that George W. Bush’s policy towards Pakistan had been ‘Musharraf-centric’ while the 
new administration’s policy would be ‘Pakistan people-centric.’115 
The US could argue that it is acting on behalf of the international community as it has done in 
the past to protect international society from terrorists hiding in FATA. However, such a 
claim does not grant carte blanche legitimacy for acting in whatever way the agent desires. It 
would still have to be seen by the rest of the international society to be acting in a just way.116 
If drone strikes are justified as a mechanism to protect international order, they need to be 
conducted responsibly, defined more than just in terms of intentionality and direct effects.  
The fourth yardstick relates to voluntarism. An agent will be held accountable if it acts on the 
basis of free volition. In other words, it chose to act in a certain way when it could have acted 
differently. The US action, as concerns the drone strikes, remains voluntary. It has the 
discretion to act differently and has not been forced to conduct the strikes. In the past, 
Washington has chosen to halt strikes when it has considered them to be detrimental in the 
achievement of its other key objectives in the region. For example, when Raymond Davis, a 
US citizen, was held in Lahore in 2011 for killing two Pakistani citizens, the tribal areas saw a 
lull in drone strikes because Washington did not want the strikes to negatively harm the 
objective of hastening the return of Davis.117 The US has also curtailed strikes in the past to 
facilitate negotiations between the Pakistani state and the Taliban in Pakistan.118 This shows 
the element of choice and that, at least to an extent, the activity is voluntary. These strikes are 
one of the ways to deal with the terrorist threat but there are other ways to tackle the problem 
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as well, such as pushing the Pakistani state to assist instead of handling it with kid gloves.119 
Because the United States chooses to employ its UAVs to target locations in FATA, it will be 
held accountable for the side-effect harm to Pakistani civilians due to the relocation of 
terrorists from FATA to other parts of Pakistan. 
Fifth, and finally, is the issue of unintentional causality. An agent conducting drone strikes 
may reasonably argue that if the strikes ended up causing a certain outcome, it was 
unintentional. Furthermore, not much could be done to prevent suspected terrorists from 
causing the harm and the killing of innocent civilians in Pakistan’s major cities – that may 
simply be a (regrettable) by-product of American counterterrorist activities in FATA. They 
may point out that those fleeing drones in FATA are independent decision-makers and that 
they choose to relocate and continue their violent activities elsewhere. Can the US be held 
responsible for the terrorists’ actions in which they may be engaging of their own free will? 
Here, a pertinent question would be: has the US benefitted from drone strikes by making it 
difficult for the suspected terrorists to hide in FATA and to harm American interests in 
Afghanistan or elsewhere? The answer is ‘yes’. However, this benefit has been derived at the 
expense of the cost to the vulnerable citizens of Sindh and Punjab who face the consequences 
of the terrorist dislocation and relocation. Like civilians elsewhere, security is the basic need 
of all Pakistani civilians. Clearly, their lives have been put in harm’s way by American 
actions and the responsibility for their plight lies at the American doorstep. Thus, according to 
this understanding of great power responsibility, Washington will be held responsible for the 
side-effect harm to the vulnerable in the targeted state even if it did not intend that outcome. 
The United States ‘benefits from the activity that created the relevant vulnerability.’120 Its 
policy has exposed a particular constituency (in this case a large number of Pakistani people) 
to harm and the risk of violent terrorism. The ethics of special responsibilities state that  
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[W]here the most capable agents have knowingly exposed particular constituencies to harm or 
risk of harm, and have also derived benefits from such actions at the expense of those who are 
made vulnerable, then they should be required to do all that they can, within the full limits of 
their capability, to prevent risk of harm or alleviate harm.121 
7. Conclusion   
This article aimed to specify the responsibility for the side-effect harms resulting due to the 
actions of great powers by constructing a set of criteria derived from the English School and 
Constructivism. 122 The main objective of this paper was to make a contribution to the IR 
theoretical debate by establishing a theoretical framework consisting of a set of yardsticks to 
study the issue of double effects and side-effect harms of great powers’ policies. By doing so, 
the article has bridged a gap in the literature on the subject and it has also helped us better 
understand the way responsibilities of great powers can be specified in different 
circumstances. Furthermore, this contribution has highlighted the need to broaden how 
responsibility for a state’s actions can be defined. Responsibility and its link to intentional 
causality is only half of the picture.123 The argument here has advanced the case for 
examining responsibility according to the yardsticks of ‘capacity’, ‘historical precedent,’ 
‘voluntarism’ and ‘unintentional causality’ (rather than just ‘intentional causality). The set of 
yardsticks discussed in this paper could be applied to any number of real-life cases of any 
great power (including China, the US, the UK or Russia).  
Here one relevant question is: what are the consequences of seeing responsibility in a number 
of ways? Does the study of the societal consequences of American drone strikes lead us to ask 
whether there is a need to revise the drone policy? The answer to that question is ‘yes.’ The 
Obama administration has come to increasingly rely on drones and they seem to be used in 
place of a coherent, long-term strategy concerning the AfPak region. Cronin has rightly 
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asserted that drones are a short-term tactical solution to a problem that requires a 
comprehensive strategy.124 Plaw and Fricker are critical of the drone policy that targets high-
value targets as well as low-level militants because they may ‘increase resentment and 
hostility both locally and across Pakistan… [and may]…undermine the fragile international 
legitimacy of the campaign.’125 Ultimately, the US policy makers need to realise that as they 
have a responsibility to protect American citizens from harm, they also have a responsibility 
to actively try and minimise harm to the citizens of Pakistan and this contribution has made a 
case for seeing great power responsibility in such a way.  
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